














































































































































Common Goals but Different Practices
Marlene Amstad and Antoine Martin 
While the goals that guide monetary policy in different countries 
are very similar, central banks diverge in their methods of 
implementing policy. This study of the policy frameworks of four 
central banks—the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, 
the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank—focuses on 
two notable areas of difference. The ﬁ  rst is the choice of an interest 
rate target, a standard feature of conventional monetary policy. 
The second is the choice of instruments for managing the central 
banks’ expanded balance sheets—a decision made necessary by 
the banks’ unconventional practice of acquiring large quantities 
of assets during the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
C
entral banks around the world have similar monetary policy goals—most 
notably, a mandate to achieve price stability. Despite their shared objectives, 
however, these institutions often implement monetary policy in different 
ways, both when the economy is strong and when it is in crisis. Understanding 
these differences, together with the costs and beneﬁ  ts of each approach, can be 
useful to policymakers, especially when a central bank adopts a new or unconven-
tional practice.
In this edition of Current Issues, we examine how four central banks—the Federal 
Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National 
Bank—approach the choice of a targeted rate of interest, or “operational target”—a 
key feature of conventional monetary policy. In addition, we consider how the same 
central banks are managing the expanded balance sheets they assumed when they 
adopted the unconventional practice of acquiring large quantities of assets. This 
practice was intended to provide much-needed liquidity to the markets and restore 
market functioning during the peak of the 2007-09 ﬁ  nancial crisis and to ease mon-
etary conditions to support nominal demand, thereby reducing the risk that inﬂ  ation 
would fall substantially below target. The asset acquisitions created substantial 
volumes of reserves that increased the size of the central banks’ balance sheets, 
altering the conditions in which the banks conduct monetary policy.1 We provide a 
discussion of the trade-offs for the alternative choices available to the banks—both 
with regard to interest rate targets and balance sheet management—and describe 
the approaches that the individual banks have taken. 
Our look at central bank approaches to operational targets focuses on the choice 
between short-term and longer-term rates. In particular, we compare the Swiss 
National Bank’s adoption of a longer-term interest rate target with the other Banks’ 
use of an overnight rate. 
1 The large supply of reserves has sparked a debate regarding whether or not these exceptional central bank 
policies are inﬂ  ationary or likely to lead to excessive lending by banks (see McAndrews [2011] and Martin, 
McAndrews, and Skeie [2011]).2
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Our review of the central banks’ methods of managing their 
large balance sheets centers on the choice of particular instru-
ments that would allow the banks to adjust interest rates without 
regard to the quantity of reserves.2 Among these instruments are 
the payment of interest on excess reserves at the policy rate, the 
issuance of central bank bills, and the use of reverse repurchase 
agreements (reverse repos).3
Interestingly, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, 
the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank have adopted 
different combinations of these instruments. The Fed pays interest 
on excess reserves at the policy rate, but is not allowed to issue 
bills. The European Central Bank does not remunerate excess 
reserves kept in the counterparties’ current account at the central 
bank, but it could immediately issue bills, an action that it has not 
taken thus far.4 The Bank of England pays interest on reserves at 
the policy rate and has issued bills. And the Swiss National Bank 
has issued bills but does not pay interest on reserves, although it 
has the authority to do so. It is too early to tell whether these dif-
ferences in practice will affect the desired policy outcomes.  
Implementation in Normal Times: The Operational Target
A central bank faces a basic trade-off when choosing an 
operational target, which is typically an interest rate target.5 
Although a longer-term money market rate is more challenging 
to target than a shorter-term rate, the former is more relevant 
to economic activity because it more directly inﬂ  uences ﬁ  rms’ 
investment choices and households’ real estate decisions. 
Longer-term money market rates are more challenging to 
target in part because a larger number of market participants 
determine the supply of and demand for such funds. Most 
central banks, including the Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank, and the Bank of England, target an overnight rate, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, while the Swiss National Bank 
targets a range for the three-month London interbank offered 
rate (Libor) for the Swiss franc.6 Because the Swiss central 
bank’s choice of a longer-term rate as its target is unusual, we 
give it particular attention in this section.
2 We do not discuss the central banks’ ability to raise or lower interest rates, which 
we believe is not in question, but the mechanics of central banks’ instruments to 
adjust rates. 
3 A repurchase agreement is a sale of securities coupled with an agreement to 
repurchase them at a speciﬁ  ed price at a later date (see Garbade [2006]). A reverse 
repurchase agreement is a purchase of securities coupled with an agreement to 
resell them at a speciﬁ  ed price at a later date.
4 The European Central Bank does pay interest, however, on excess (surplus) 
reserves placed at its deposit facility, at a rate lower than its policy rate. 
5 The Bank for International Settlements (2007) and Sturm (2010) discuss the 
monetary policy implementation frameworks cited in this article.
6 Libor is the offered rate for unsecured interbank lending in the London 
interbank market and is calculated for different currencies by the British 
Bankers’ Association. 
Choosing an Operational Target
The operational target is the instrument the central bank uses 
to achieve its objectives and to communicate the stance of its 
monetary policy. The link between the operational target and 
the central bank’s objective needs to be tight so that changes in 
the target can inﬂ  uence the economy’s performance in the long 
run. The central bank’s ability to keep the interest rate close to 
this target also signals how well the bank is fulﬁ  lling its mandate. 
Such a signal is important because a more direct measure of the 
central bank’s performance—for example, its ability to maintain 
price stability—may be observable only with a long lag.
Having control over the operational target is also important 
because it facilitates the central bank’s communication with 
ﬁ  nancial market participants. In normal market conditions, 
central banks can control the overnight rate tightly because they 
have a precise estimate of both the demand for overnight reserves 
and the supply of those reserves. In many countries, the demand 
for overnight reserves stems from the banking system’s required 
(or voluntary) level of reserves.7 In such cases, the central bank 
can estimate with some precision the amount of reserves the 
banking system needs to hold over a given period. In countries 
where there are no reserve requirements, the demand for over-
night reserves is typically at very low levels, which the central 
bank can also estimate.8 
Meanwhile, the supply of reserves is determined by the 
central bank, subject to “autonomous factors” outside its control.  
These factors include payments that can affect the supply of 
reserves on a given day, such as payments into and out of a 
treasury account. Typically, central banks can form accurate 
estimates of these autonomous factors.9 Accordingly, with 
detailed knowledge of demand and with control over the supply 
of reserves, the central bank can meet its operational target 
with precision. 
It is more difﬁ  cult to target longer-term money rates or even 
capital market rates because several factors outside of the central 
bank’s control inﬂ  uence the supply of and demand for reserves in 
these markets. Nevertheless, if credit-risk premia—the increased 
compensation investors require to hold riskier assets—and the 
term structure of interest rates are sufﬁ  ciently stable, intervention 
in the overnight market, or in other very short-term markets, will 
allow the central bank to steer longer-term rates. In these circum-
stances, targeting the overnight rate will inﬂ  uence longer-term 
rates in a predictable manner.
7 Where reserves are voluntarily held, the demand to hold them will be a function 
of the remuneration rate, among other things.
8 In principle, the aggregate demand for reserves should be zero. Indeed, absent 
reserve requirements, any bank holding positive reserves should be able to lend 
those reserves to a bank having an exactly offsetting negative position. In practice, 
because of frictions in the interbank market and payment needs, demand remains 
for a small quantity of reserves.
9 Keister, Martin, and McAndrews (2008) provide more details about monetary 
policy implementation with an overnight rate as the operational target.If credit-risk premia or the term structure of interest 
rates is unstable, which is likely to happen in times of market 
stress, stabilizing the overnight rate can be more difﬁ  cult. And 
stabilizing the overnight rate will not prevent longer and more 
economically relevant interest rates from ﬂ  uctuating with 
credit-risk or liquidity premia, the latter reﬂ  ecting the increased 
compensation investors require to hold less-liquid assets. For 
example, if credit risk or liquidity risk suddenly increases, then 
monetary policy will be more constraining and less stabilizing 
than desired, for any given level of the overnight rate. 
In principle, a central bank could choose the overnight rate 
as its operational target in normal times, when changes in 
short-term rates inﬂ  uence longer-term rates in a predictable 
manner, and switch to a longer rate during a crisis. By focusing 
on a longer rate in troubled times, the central bank could partly 
offset the volatility of credit-risk and liquidity premia. Changing 
the operational target during a crisis is unappealing, however, 
as such a change would make communication with ﬁ  nancial 
market participants difﬁ  cult and raise market uncertainty 
precisely at a time when it would be least desirable. 
The Swiss Approach 10
The Swiss National Bank appears to have done well using a 
range for a longer-term rate as its operational target.11 We show 
that this central bank has been able to target the three-month 
Libor effectively. To assess how the bank has fared with this 
framework, we track a measure of stress in the money market 
during the 2007-09 ﬁ  nancial crisis. While this measure does not 
provide direct evidence about the suitability of the central bank’s 
framework for implementing monetary policy, we argue that if 
the framework were inadequate, it would likely be reﬂ  ected in 
interbank market stress during the crisis. Finally, we illustrate 
a potential beneﬁ  t of targeting a longer-term rate as opposed 
to an overnight rate.
When the Swiss central bank introduced its current monetary 
policy implementation framework at the end of 1999, few Swiss 
franc money-market segments were liquid and sufﬁ  ciently 
developed to accommodate the needs of monetary policy 
implementation.12 The three-month Swiss franc Libor market was 
viewed as the best candidate, since it was the most liquid money 
market as well as the one most relevant to economic activity. 
10 Since September 6, 2011, the Swiss National Bank has implemented a 
minimum exchange rate in addition to its operational target. Because the central 
bank’s experience with the minimum exchange rate has been very limited, we 
focus only on the time before September.
11 Jordan, Peytrignet, and Rossi (2010) provide an overview of the Swiss National 
Bank’s experience since adopting this operational target.
12 Before 1999, the Swiss National Bank had a medium-term target for the 
seasonally adjusted monetary base. The change in concept was necessary because 
measures of money demand became increasingly unstable. Every quarter since 
2000, the central bank has published a target range (comprising a percentage 
point) for the three-month Swiss franc Libor; the Swiss National Bank generally 
aims to keep Libor in the middle of that range. 
The Swiss National Bank uses a variety of instruments to 
steer the three-month Swiss franc Libor within its targeted 
range.13 Before the crisis, these instruments were mainly daily 
one-week repos. Since the outbreak of the crisis, longer-term 
repos, foreign-exchange swaps and purchases, reverse repos, and 
central bank bills have been used to steer liquidity provision and 
ensure that the three-month Libor remains in the targeted range. 
The mechanics are very similar to those used by other central 
banks to inﬂ  uence the overnight rate. When the Swiss National 
Bank injects reserves into the banking system, it expects the 
three-month Libor to fall; when the bank reduces the quantity 
of reserves in the system, it expects the three-month Libor to 
rise. Both before and during the crisis, the bank maintained 
tight control over its operational target (Chart 1).14
Next, we look at the Swiss central bank’s experience during 
the crisis. We focus on the risk premia in money markets, as 
measured by the spread between Libor and the rate on overnight 
index swaps (OIS).15 These spreads were widely used as indica-
tors of ﬁ  nancial market stress during the crisis because they 
reﬂ  ect the difference between collateralized and uncollateralized 
rates and therefore provide an indicator of the trust banks have 
13 Over the course of the crisis, the liquidity regime of Switzerland changed 
from a structural liquidity deﬁ  cit to a structural liquidity surplus. Therefore, 
the instruments chosen to steer the three-month Libor changed from liquidity-
providing to liquidity-absorbing instruments.
14 Abbassi, Nautz, and Offermanns (2010) present a statistical analysis that 
reinforces this view; see, for example, their Tables 1 and 3. Further evidence 
is provided by developments in August 2011, when the Swiss National Bank’s 
announcement that it would substantially increase reserves was followed by a 
marked fall in the three-month Libor.
15 OIS is a ﬁ  xed/ﬂ  oating interest rate swap with the ﬂ  oating leg tied to daily 
rates—speciﬁ  cally, the federal funds rate for U.S. dollars, the euro overnight 
index average (eonia) for euros, the sterling overnight index average (sonia) for 
British pounds, and the tomorrow next overnight index swap (TOIS) rate for 
Swiss francs.
  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   3
Sources: Swiss National Bank Market Analysis Platform; Bloomberg L.P. 
Note: Libor is London interbank offered rate.
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in their interbank counterparties. Numerous factors could have 
inﬂ  uenced these spreads, so they provide only indirect evidence 
of the central bank’s performance. 
We compare the Libor-OIS spread for the European Central 
Bank, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of England, and the 
Federal Reserve. In the months prior to the crisis, the risk 
premium in each currency was approximately 5 basis points. 
All spreads increased in August 2007, at the onset of the crisis, 
but remained in a range of 25 to 100 basis points for most of 
the period until September 2008, when Lehman Brothers ﬁ  led 
for bankruptcy. All spreads rose dramatically after Lehman’s 
collapse and reached their peak shortly thereafter. During this 
period, the spreads for the British pound and U.S. dollar were 
the highest and most volatile, while the Swiss franc spreads 
were generally below the spreads for the other currencies; euro 
spreads were somewhere in between (Chart 2). As noted above, 
this does not provide direct evidence of the central bank’s 
performance. The mean, median, maximum, minimum, and 
standard deviation of Libor-OIS spreads for each currency 
before and during the crisis are reported in Table 1.
There is a potential beneﬁ  t in using a three-month rate as a 
target: It can allow the central bank to stabilize the more economi-
cally relevant long-term rate, while letting shorter rates ﬂ  uctuate 
to absorb changes in risk or liquidity premia. Chart 3 plots the 
one-week Swiss franc repo rate and the one-week euribor as well 
as the three-month Libor for each currency at the onset of the 
crisis. In the euro market, the three-month Libor exhibited some 
volatility, while the rate in the European Central Bank’s one-week 
auction, the one-week euribor, was quite stable. In contrast, in the 
Swiss franc market, the three-month Libor was kept much more 
stable while the one-week repo rate ﬂ  uctuated. 
Some attribute the movements in these rates to volatile 
credit-risk or liquidity premia during the period under con-
sideration. The Swiss National Bank was able to move its repo 
rates to cushion the changes in credit-risk and/or liquidity 
premia, thereby keeping the three-month Libor as stable as pos-
sible.16 Large changes in the one-week repo rate did not create 
any communication difﬁ  culties since they are not the focus of 
the Swiss framework for monetary policy implementation. In 
contrast, the European Central Bank’s practice is to stabilize 
short-term rates. Hence, the one-week euribor was stable and 
changes in the credit-risk or liquidity premia were reﬂ  ected in 
the three-month Libor. 
The longer-term target comes with the additional advantage 
that varying short-term instruments can be used for its imple-
mentation. The Swiss central bank announced in August 2011 
that it would aim to keep the three-month Libor as close to zero as 
possible. To reach this goal, the bank could use various short-term 
instruments (such as foreign exchange swaps and the buyback of 
central bank bills) without causing communication difﬁ  culties. 
The experience of the Swiss National Bank suggests that it is 
possible to target longer-term interest rates, even during times 
of stress in the money markets. However, this ﬁ  nding does 
not imply that central banks targeting overnight rates should 
reconsider their monetary policy implementation frameworks, 
especially if these frameworks have performed reliably. Never-
theless, the Swiss National Bank’s experience in steering an 
uncollateralized longer-term rate could be instructive for 
central banks that are considering modifying their monetary 
policy implementation framework. 
16 Both credit risk and liquidity risk can occur as the Swiss National Bank steers 
an uncollateralized longer-term rate, the three-month Libor, with a collateralized 
shorter-term rate, the (typically one-week) repo rate.
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
Notes: Libor is London interbank offered rate; OIS is overnight index swap; sonia
is sterling overnight index average; euribor is euro-area interbank offered rate; eonia
is euro overnight index average; TOIS is tomorrow next overnight index swap;
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U.S. dollar 3M Libor – 3M OIS rate
Swiss franc 3M Libor – 3M TOIS rate
Euro 3M euribor – 3M eonia 
swap rate
British pound 3M Libor –




Swiss Franc Euro British Pound U.S. Dollar
Mean 35.8 56.2 64.9 56.7
Median 30.7 45.7 48.5 41.3
Maximum 174.1 206.9 298.9 364.4
Minimum -0.6 4.4 7.1 6.0
Standard deviation 28.9 37.0 54.8 57.6
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
Note: The sample period is June 2007–August 2011.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   5
Implementation in Unusual Times: Interest on Reserves, 
Central Bank Bills, and Exit Strategy
The different practices adopted by central banks during the crisis 
are especially interesting because all of the institutions discussed 
here implemented exceptional or unconventional measures. 
In particular, they acquired large quantities of assets, thereby 
increasing the size of their balance sheets, as shown in Chart 4. 
This section focuses on some options central banks have at their 
disposal to manage these large balance sheets.17
A direct consequence of these asset purchases has been an 
increase in reserves held by the banking sector or, more precisely, 
by all institutions with an account at a central bank.18 This 
situation has prompted many central banks to consider how 
they will implement monetary policy when they need to raise 
interest rates from their current low levels. The banks’ common 
goal is to conduct monetary policy effectively as they increase 
interest rates toward more usual levels, even if their balance 
sheets are still large. In this section, we discuss the instruments 
available and how they can be used.
Before the crisis, central banks would typically implement 
monetary policy by setting the supply of reserves equal to the 
demand for reserves at the desired interest rate.19 The demand 
for reserves can have different origins. The Federal Reserve, the 
European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank impose 
17 We do not discuss other exceptional measures, such as the central bank dollar 
swap facilities. For a discussion of these facilities, see Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu 
(2011) and Fleming and Klagge (2010).
18 See Keister and McAndrews (2009).
19 Keister, Martin, and McAndrews (2008) provide an introduction to monetary 
policy implementation, with and without interest paid on excess reserves. In this 
section, we summarize the key ideas.
reserve requirements, obliging banks to hold a certain level of 
reserves if they wish to avoid penalties. The Bank of England 
allows banks to set voluntary reserve targets. 
Reserves held in excess of the required or targeted amount 
were remunerated at an interest rate lower than the policy rate, 
if at all.20 For that reason, an increase in the amount of reserves 
supplied by the central bank could lead to a decrease in short-
term interest rates, as banks tried to sell excess reserves to limit 
the opportunity cost of holding them. This, in turn, would put 
pressure on longer term rates because banks understand that an 
alternative to borrowing at a longer term is to roll over shorter-
term loans. Hence, if banks anticipate that they can borrow at 
low short-term rates in the interbank market, longer-term rates 
will have to decrease accordingly. 
In some cases, a decrease in the level of short-term interest 
rates was indeed observed as central banks increased the supply 
of reserves during the crisis.21 This was not necessarily a 
problem, because many central banks had lowered their target 
interest rate in response to the crisis. At some point in time, 
however, central banks have to think about how they can raise 
interest rates when it becomes appropriate to do so. 
One possibility would be to sell the assets they have purchased 
or allow temporary operations to mature and simply return to a 
state similar to that prevailing before the crisis. However, selling 
so many assets in a short period could move asset prices in 
20 Reserves are remunerated if the central bank pays interest on these reserves. 
In some cases, reserves may be remunerated at a range above the required or 
targeted amount of reserves. 
21 The Bank of England remunerated all reserves at the policy rate and, for that 
reason, did not experience sustained episodes during which short-term market 
interest rates were below the policy rate.
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
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ﬁ  nancial markets in unexpected and potentially disruptive ways. 
Hence, central banks will want to consider a broader range of 
options for raising interest rates.
Given their monetary policy implementation frameworks, 
the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of 
England, and the Swiss National Bank have two broad choices 
if they see a need to increase interest rates as their economies 
recover. They can increase the rate they pay on reserves, to keep it 
equal to the desired level of the policy rate, or they can take steps 
(for example, by issuing central bank bills) to reduce the level 
of reserves, potentially to pre-crisis levels, so that the banking 
system will not need to hold excessively high levels of reserves. 
Costs and Beneﬁ  ts of a Large Balance Sheet
From an implementation perspective, there are beneﬁ  ts and some 
potential costs when central banks hold a large balance sheet on 
a permanent basis. The beneﬁ  ts stem from the fact that reserves 
are the only means by which large-value payments can be 
settled with ﬁ  nality (notes are impractical for such payments).22 
Increasing the amount of reserves in the system reduces the need 
for banks to borrow reserves from the central bank intraday to 
make payments and reduces the incentives bank have to delay 
payments. Another beneﬁ  t of a large supply of reserves is that it 
may help banks meet the new Basel III requirements for holding 
safe assets. However, too many reserves could be a problem for 
the banking system. Only institutions that have an account at the 
central bank can hold reserves and, collectively, these institutions 
must hold all the reserves that the central bank issues.23 In other 
22 Following others, we deﬁ  ne ﬁ  nality in this context as legal ﬁ  nality. In an 
economic sense, ﬁ  nality comes about only when a settlement has taken place, 
with the parties agreeing to settle the transaction with any asset, not necessarily 
reserves.  
23 See Keister and McAndrews (2009).
words, as the central bank issues more reserves, the aggregated 
balance sheet of the banking system—or, more precisely, of all 
central bank account holders—must increase. 
In principle, the increase in the level of reserves held by the 
banking sector need not be worrisome. Reserves are a perfectly 
liquid and risk-free asset, so they should carry no cost of eco-
nomic capital and should not affect leverage ratios negatively. 
Nevertheless, market observers have raised the concern that 
banks may face increased costs if excess reserves “clog up” their 
balance sheets.24 Moreover, banks may incur higher costs from 
the size of their balance sheets because of agency costs or 
regulatory requirements on a bank’s capital or leverage. 
Instruments Available to Central Banks 
with Large Balance Sheets
Central banks have several instruments that can help them 
manage the size of their balance sheets and implement 
monetary policy even with a large balance sheet. This section 
focuses on three instruments: interest on reserves, central bank 
bills, and reverse repos. 
Interest on Reserves
The quantity of reserves supplied by a central bank will affect the 
bank’s ability to reach its target only if the demand for reserves 
is downward sloping at that quantity, as illustrated in Exhibit 1. 
The diagram depicts the demand curve for reserves in blue. The 
demand for reserves is nil above the central bank’s lending rate, 
since banks will prefer to borrow reserves at the central bank 
rather than pay a higher price in the market.25 Similarly, the 
demand for reserves becomes elastic at the central bank’s deposit 
rate, as banks prefer to earn the interest on reserves paid by the 
central bank rather than lend the reserves in the market at a 
lower rate. The supply of reserves by the central bank is repre-
sented in the diagram as a vertical line, and the interbank market 
rate is determined by the intersection of the supply of, and the 
demand for, reserves.
If the supply of reserves is sufﬁ  ciently large, then the supply 
curve intersects the demand curve in a section where it is roughly 
ﬂ  at. In Exhibit 1, the interest rate is the same whether the supply 
of reserves intersects demand at point A or at point B. If the 
central bank does not pay interest on reserves, the demand curve 
will be ﬂ  at around a zero interest rate. If the central bank does 
pay interest on excess reserves, then the demand curve will be 
ﬂ  at at a level that is close to the interest paid on excess reserves. 
24 This concern was noted by Wrightson ICAP (2008).  See also Wrightson ICAP 
(2009).
25 Exhibit 1 assumes that there is no stigma associated with borrowing at the 
central bank’s lending facility. 
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
Chart 4
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Accordingly, a central bank could implement monetary policy 
while holding a large supply of reserves simply by changing the 
interest it pays on excess reserves. This process is particularly 
straightforward for central banks that target an overnight rate, 
since they can set their target close to the interest rate they pay 
on reserves. For a central bank targeting a longer-term operating 
target, the process could be a little more complicated to imple-
ment, because the central bank will need to learn how to set 
the interest it pays on reserves to support its longer-term 
objective.26 
Central Bank Bills 
Public sector assets that are a close substitute for reserves as a store 
of value could be used to relieve pressure on the banking sector’s 
balance sheet, provided institutions that do not have a reserve 
account can hold these assets. For example, institutions outside 
the banking sector can hold short-term government debt. 27 
Central bank bills can play the same role because these assets 
are similar to government debt. These bills change the composi-
tion but not the size of the central bank’s balance sheet.28 They 
allow the central bank to reduce the level of reserves, which can 
26 If a central bank pays interest on reserves, this reserve rate could become the 
key policy rate.
27 The issuance and sale of this debt could be used to reduce the level of reserves 
held by the banking sector, if the necessary coordination with the U.S. Treasury 
Department can be established. Such an action was taken in the United States in 
the fall of 2008, when the Supplementary Financing Program (SFP) was initiated.  
(See Haubrich and Lindner [2009] for more details about this program.) The 
reserves acquired in the sale of Treasury securities from the SFP are removed 
from the banking system’s aggregate balance sheet and replaced by the Treasury 
securities. Since these securities can be held outside the banking system, this 
action can reduce the size of the banking system’s aggregate balance sheet.   
28 On the liability side of the central bank’s balance sheet, the newly issued bills 
replace the reserves that are acquired from the sale of bills. Recall that reserves are 
a liability of the central bank. Hence, the size of the central bank’s balance sheet is 
unaffected.
be held only by the banking sector, by replacing reserves with 
assets that can be held by other institutions. When the bills are 
sold to institutions outside the banking system, the aggregate 
size of the banking sector’s balance sheet shrinks.   
Central bank bills are a more convenient instrument than the 
issuance and sale of government debt because they do not require 
close coordination between a country’s central bank and its 
treasury. Nevertheless, the issuance of central bank bills should 
not interfere with the issuance of government debt. To limit the 
risk of interference, central banks that issue bills typically choose 
shorter-term maturities, such as one week up to maximum of one 
year, and relatively large denominations, which are convenient 
for ﬁ  nancial institutions but not for retail investors. Government 
bills, by contrast, have longer maturities, ranging from one or 
three months to (most typically) years. Moreover, government 
bills are often available in relatively small denominations to 
accommodate retail investors.
Reverse Repos 
Reverse repos have also been used by central banks to reduce the 
level of reserves. Like the issuance of central bank bills, the use of 
reverse repos changes the composition of the liability side of the 
central bank’s balance sheet without changing its size.29
In contrast to central bank bills, which can be transferred from 
institutions that have a central bank account to institutions that 
do not, reverse repos typically cannot be transferred to additional 
parties.  Hence, in the case of reverse repos, the banking sector 
and the central banks are not able to reduce the size of their bal-
ance sheets. Partly for that reason, the Federal Reserve plans to 
engage in reverse repos with an expanded set of counterparties, 
29 In the initial leg of the reverse repo, the central bank receives money from its 
repo counterparty and pledges collateral. When the reverse repo matures, the 
central bank returns the reserves to its counterparty and gets back the collateral.
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including institutions that do not have an account at the Fed.30 
This move would allow the use of reverse repos to reduce the level 
of reserves held by the banking system.
Exhibit 2 shows how engaging in reverse repos with an 
extended set of counterparties or issuing central bank bills 
will reduce the level of reserves. Like Exhibit 1, this diagram 
represents the demand for reserves in blue and the supply of 
reserves as a vertical line. If a central bank does not pay interest 
on reserves at the policy rate and its supply of reserves is large, 
the supply and demand for reserves will intersect at point B, 
which does not correspond to the target rate. Reducing the supply 
of reserves through reverse repos or the issuance of central bank 
bills can allow the intersection to occur at point A, the target rate. 
Central Bank Practice
This section discusses how—or even whether—the four central 
banks studied here have used the instruments described above. 
Interestingly, each of these central banks has adopted a different 
mix of the instruments (Table 2). 
The Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve received the authority to pay interest on 
reserves in October 2008 and has been paying interest on re-
quired and excess reserves ever since. The federal funds rate has 
been slightly below the interest rate paid on reserves because 
some ﬁ  nancial institutions are not eligible to receive interest on 
the reserves they hold in their accounts at the Fed. In particular, 
government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac do not receive interest on reserves. Nevertheless, 
the Fed should be able to raise the federal funds rate by increas-
ing the interest rate it pays on reserves.31
30 For more information, see http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/rrp_counterparties
.html.
31 See Bech and Klee (2009) for a discussion. 
The Federal Reserve does not have the authority to issue 
central bank bills, so it cannot use that instrument to reduce the 
supply of reserves. Instead, the Fed could decrease reserves by 
engaging in reverse repos with an expanded set of counterparties. 
The European Central Bank
The European Central Bank has the authority to pay interest 
on reserves and to issue bills, known as debt certiﬁ  cates. Banks 
earn interest on required reserves held at the European Central 
Bank, but excess reserves placed in banks’ reserve accounts at the 
central bank do not earn interest. Excess (surplus) reserves can 
earn some interest, however, if they are placed in the European 
Central Bank’s deposit facility, although the rate of interest earned 
is lower than the policy rate. The European Central Bank has not 
modiﬁ  ed this practice during the crisis even as it has supplied an 
increased amount of reserves. Moreover, the central bank has not 
issued debt certiﬁ  cates since its inception. 
The European Central Bank would be immediately able to 
start issuing bills if it felt the need to do so, but it would require a 
modiﬁ  cation of its operational framework to start paying interest 
on excess reserves at the policy rate. So far, it has not used either 
instrument, in contrast to the other central banks discussed in 
this article.
The Bank of England
The Bank of England has the authority to pay interest on reserves 
and to issue central bank bills. Of the four central banks discussed 
here, it is the only one to have used both instruments during the 
crisis. It has also engaged in some reverse repos. 
Before the crisis, the Bank of England paid interest on reserves 
held by banks if the quantity of reserves held was close to the vol-
untary targets set by the banks. After launching its asset purchase 
program during the crisis, however, the Bank of England decided 
to pay the policy rate for all reserves held by banks as the supply 
Table 2
Summary of Central Bank Practices
Federal Reserve European Central Bank Bank of England Swiss National Bank
Key policy rate Uncollateralized
interbank rate target
(federal funds rate)a
Minimum bid rate in main 
reﬁ  nancing operation 
Ofﬁ  cial bank rate 
paid on commercial 
bank reserves
Swiss franc three-month Libor
Operational target Uncollateralized interbank rate 
(federal funds rate)
No ofﬁ  cial target Overnight interest rates to be in line 
with the bank’s ofﬁ  cial rate
Target range for Swiss franc 
three-month Libor
Pay interest on reserves? Yesb Noc Yes, at bank rated Noe
Issue bills? No No Yes Yes
a Beginning in December 2008, the policy rate objective was established as a range.
b Interest payments on reserves commenced October 9, 2008. Currently, the rate paid on required reserve balances is the targeted federal funds rate.
c The European Central Bank remunerates required reserve balances at the main operations rate; excess reserves are remunerated at a rate lower than the implicit policy rate. 
d The Bank of England does not require depository institutions to hold reserves. Excess reserves are remunerated if they are within a speciﬁ  ed range of a voluntary target. 
e The Swiss National Bank has reserve requirements, but does not remunerate reserves.   www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   9
Interestingly, the four central banks we focus on here have 
used different approaches to achieve their objectives—a reﬂ  ec-
tion, perhaps, of the unique institutional setting in which each 
one operates. It is too early to tell if the various practices they 
use to manage their large balance sheets will lead to divergent 
outcomes. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that all four central 
banks have chosen a slightly different mix of instruments. 
And it is possible that some of the authorized instruments not 
currently being used by the banks will be employed at some 
point in the future. 
By observing the diversity of central bank approaches, we 
can learn more about the operation of monetary policy imple-
mentation frameworks. This is particularly important for new 
aspects of these frameworks, such as the management of large 
balance sheets. This study explores some of the variation across 
central bank practices, with the hope of expanding our awareness 
of the policy instruments and strategies that are possible. 
The authors thank Michael Cross, Sarah John, Sebastien 
Kraenzlin, Anna Nordstrom, Michael Paprotta, Dimitrios Rakitzis, 
Andrew Sturm, and Jens Tapking for useful comments during the 
writing of this article.
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